

**Political Science 813: International Security**  
**Spring 2011**

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Office Hours:  
Wed 9-12 (WA)  
Or by Appointment

Time and Location:  
T 7:05-9:55  
WA 230

**Course Description:**

This course emphasizes theoretical and empirical work on issues broadly characterized as international security. For our purposes, this means a particular focus on topics such as the causes and consequences of militarized conflict, alliance behavior, the role of international institutions, and cooperation. Our readings provide an array of viewpoints for why these behaviors and outcomes occur – ranging from the systemic (the interaction and distribution of power amongst all states) down to a state's own attributes. Along with this diversity of explanations, we also consider a wide variety of methodological approaches – formal mathematical modeling, quantitative analyses, and case studies. After taking the course, you should be familiar with some (and a few of the classics) of the scientific literature on international security. This class should also provide a framework that allows you to develop your own research agenda and interests.

This is a graduate seminar and as such, classes are geared around discussion of the readings. The scientific study of international processes rarely yields concrete results and findings that stand the test of time (think of the physical sciences). As a result, it is important that you critically engage both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the readings. In addition, a graduate course implies that you have an interest in the field above that of undergrads – that being said, the work and the expectations are increased. Your preparedness for class, participation, and work should reflect more than just a basic consumption of the material.

**Readings:**

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Senese, Paul and John Vasquez. 2008. *The Steps to War: An Empirical Study*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vasquez, John and Marie Henehan, eds. 1992. *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Articles presented in the course outline are available on JSTOR. Readings that are not available via JSTOR will be posted by the instructor on k-state online. Readings that are neither articles nor part of assigned books are posted to k-state online. I also reserve the right to change reading (articles, not books) on my discretion.

### **Course Requirements:**

**Participation.** Each student is expected to attend class, complete all required readings, and *significantly contribute* to discussion each week. One comment during the course of the seminar does not reflect a significant contribution. Individuals that wrote discussion papers and questions should take a large role in directing and shaping discussion. If there is no discussion, I will direct it and I will call upon people. Participation (and not merely attendance) is essential for your success in this class. This comprises 20% of your grade.

**Discussion Papers and Questions.** You will write 4 discussion papers (3 page maximum). Discussion papers should not be a simple recitation of what you have read. Instead, they should be a critical response to what you have just read. Approaches can include: 1.) criticisms and suggestions for improvement in the theory, methods, or conclusions of specific papers. 2.) extensions or research questions that come from the readings. 3.) theoretical or methodological inconsistencies between articles from the same week or from previous weeks. A document that may help (one that I used in grad school) is posted to k-state online.

Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of what you can write about. If you have any questions about what you wish to write about, please let me know. In addition, students will also provide three questions to be discussed by the class. The papers and questions should be sent via email to the rest of the class and the instructor by 5:00pm on the Monday prior to our class meeting. Students not writing for the week should still read and be ready to discuss the points and the questions raised in the discussion papers. We will determine who is writing for each week in the first class meeting. This comprises 25% of your grade. Late papers (after 5:00pm Monday but before class) will be penalized by a deduction of one letter grade.

**Literature Review.** These are foundational readings in international relations and security studies. It is likely that you will, at some point, come back to these readings in either an academic or professional capacity. As a result, it is important that you have a thorough knowledge of these readings. Accordingly, you will write a 10 page literature review on one of the reading topics. More specifically, I would like for you to identify 4-6 other works related to your topic, identify and discuss prominent themes in the literature, discuss current work, point out strengths and weaknesses of current work, and develop pertinent research questions.

In order to help you, I have established several dates by which I would like to see certain elements of your research proposal. These are due prior to class. I will not grade the individual components, just the end results.

February 15<sup>th</sup>: Identify topics of interest.

March 8<sup>th</sup>: An annotated bibliography with at least 10 sources

March 29<sup>th</sup>: A rough draft of the first half of your paper.

April 29<sup>th</sup>: Paper due by 5:00pm (Email to Class). In your paper, you should address questions and comments given to you from the first draft.

This is 25% of your grade. A good paper here is critical to complete the final portion of your grade. Late papers will be penalized by a deduction of one letter grade per day late

**Take Home Final.** You will have a take home final distributed before the last class meeting. There will be three questions (related to the course topics) and they will be patterned on the preliminary exams that graduate students must pass to advance to the dissertation stage of the PhD program. This means that they are framed in a way that requires both critical thinking and an integration of the readings. You are free to use the literature reviews written by you and the other students. Unlike the preliminary exams, you will have three days to complete it – from the end of class to 5:00pm of the last day of classes. This is 30% of your grade. A penalty of one letter grade per day will be enforced for late finals.

### **Grading Scale**

A standard grading scale is used:

A: 90% or greater

B: 80-89

C: 70-79

D: 60-69

F: 59% and below

### **Note:**

Please feel free to see me if you have any questions or concerns. Concerns about grades are much easier to rectify early in the semester than late.

### **University Policies:**

#### **Academic Honesty**

The following is taken verbatim from <http://www.k-state.edu/honor/faculty/syllabusstate.htm>:

Kansas State University has an Honor & Integrity System based on personal integrity which is presumed to be sufficient assurance in academic matters one's work is performed honestly and without

unauthorized assistance. Undergraduate and graduate students, by registration, acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Honor & Integrity System. The policies and procedures of the Honor System apply to all full and part-time students enrolled in undergraduate and graduate courses on-campus, off-campus, and via distance learning.

A component vital to the Honor & Integrity System is the inclusion of the [Honor Pledge](#) which applies to all assignments, examinations, or other course work undertaken by students. The Honor Pledge is implied, *whether or not* it is stated: **"On my honor, as a student, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this academic work."**

The default in this class is that ALL work will be accomplished individually, UNLESS my permission is given in advance of an assignment/quiz/exam/take-home exam/final. If you are in doubt, please ask

A grade of [XF](#) can result from a breach of academic honesty. The F indicates failure in the course; the X indicates the reason is an Honor Pledge violation.

For more information, visit the Honor & Integrity System home web page at: <http://www.ksu.edu/honor>

### **Classroom Conduct**

The following is taken verbatim from <http://www.k-state.edu/provost/policies/course.htm>:

"All student activities in the University, including this course, are governed by the Student Judicial Conduct Code as outlined in the Student Governing Association By Laws, Article VI, Section 3, number 2. Students who engage in behavior that disrupts the learning environment may be asked to leave the class. "

### **Disability Services**

The following is taken verbatim from <http://www.k-state.edu/provost/resources/teaching/course.htm>:

"Any student with a disability who needs a classroom accommodation, access to technology or other academic assistance in this course should contact Disability Support Services ([dss@k-state.edu](mailto:dss@k-state.edu)) and/or the instructor. DSS serves students with a wide range of disabilities including, but not limited to, physical disabilities, sensory impairments, learning disabilities, attention deficit disorder, depression, and anxiety."

### **Course Outline**

*Week 1 (January 18, 2011) – Review Syllabus*

*Week 2 (January 25, 2011) – International Security as Social Science*

Zinnes, Dina. 1980. Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher. *International Studies Quarterly* 24(3): 315–42.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1985. Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View. *International Studies Quarterly* 29(2): 121-136.

- Walt, Stephen M. 1999. Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies. *International Security* 23(4): 5–48.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and James D. Morrow. 1999. Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions. *International Security* 24(2): 56–73.
- Braumoeller, Bear and Anne Sartori. 2004. “The Promise and Perils of Statistics in International Relations,” in Sprinz, Detlef and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (eds.) *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pgs. 129-151.

*Week 3 (February 1, 2011) – Studying Security*

- Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. Redefining Security. *Foreign Affairs* 68(2): 162-177
- Walt, Stephen. 1991. The Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly* 35(2): 211-240
- Kolodziej, Edward. 1992. Renaissance of Security Studies? Caveat Lector! *International Studies Quarterly* 36(4): 421-438
- Betts, Richard. 1997. Should Strategic Studies Survive? *World Politics* 50(1): 7-34
- Walt, Stephen. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy* 110: 29-46.

*Week 4 (February 8, 2011) – Systemic Explanations of War I*

- Levy, Jack. 1985. Theories of General War. *World Politics* 37(3): 344-374.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1992. “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War,” in Vasquez, John and Marie Henehan (eds.) *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*. Lanham: Lexington Books. Pgs 37-74.
- Modelski, George and William Thompson. 1989. “Long Cycles and Global War,” in Manus Midlarsky (ed.) *Handbook of War Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pgs 23-54.
- Wohlforth, William. 1999. The Stability of a Unipolar World. *International Security* 24(1): 5-41.

*Week 5 (February 15, 2011) – Systemic Explanations of War II*

- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*Week 6 (February 22, 2011) – Domestic Level Explanations I – Democratic Peace*

- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 87: 624-38.
- Dixon, William. 1994. Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 88: 14-32.

Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and the Danger of War. *International Security* 20(1): 5-38.

Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 585-602.

*Week 7 (March 1, 2011) – Domestic Level Explanations II – Institutions*

Fearon, James. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-592.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alistair Smith. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 93(4): 791-807.

Schultz, Kenneth. 1999. Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. *International Organization* 53(2): 233-266.

Mitchell, Sara. 2002. A Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 749-759.

*Week 8 (March 8, 2011) – Rivalry*

Goertz, Gary and Paul Diehl. 1993. Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns. *International Studies Quarterly* 37(2): 147-171

Thompson, William. 1995. Principle Rivalries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39(2): 195-223.

Gartzke, Erik and Michael Simon. 1999. "Hot Hand": A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries. *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 777-798.

Thompson, William. 2001. Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4): 557-586.

*Week 9 (March 15, 2011) – Arms Races*

Diehl, Paul. 1992. "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," in Vasquez, John and Marie Henahan (eds.) *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*. Lanham: Lexington Books. Pgs 93-108.

Wallace, Michael. 1992. "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," in Vasquez, John and Marie Henahan (eds.) *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*. Lanham: Lexington Books. Pgs 75-92.

Sample, Susan. 1997. Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate. *Journal of Peace Research* 34(1): 7-22.

Gibler, Douglas, Toby Rider, and Marc Hutchinson. 2005. Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry. *Journal of Peace Research* 42(2): 131-147.

*Week 10 (March 22, 2011) – Spring Break – No Class*

*Week 11 (March 29, 2011) – Issues in Conflict*

Senese, Paul and John Vasquez. 2008. *The Steps to War: An Empirical Study*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

*Week 12 (April 5, 2011) – Deterrence*

Huth, Paul. 1988. Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War. *American Political Science Review*, 82(2): 423-443.

Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Stein. 1990. Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable. *World Politics* 42(3): 336-369.

Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. 1990. Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference. *World Politics* 42(4): 466-501.

Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. 1993. General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models. *American Political Science Review* 87(1): 61-73.

*Week 13 (April 12, 2011) – Bargaining, Information, and Resolve in Conflict*

Leng, Russell. 1992. "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises," in Vasquez, John and Marie Henehan (eds.) *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*. Lanham: Lexington Books. Pgs 109-140.

Fearon, James D. 1994. Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2): 236-269.

Fearon, James. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Ramsay, Kris. 2004. Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4): 459-486.

*Week 14 (April 19, 2011) – Alliances*

Sabrosky, Alan. 1980. "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in J. David Singer (ed.), *The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models*. New York: Free Press.

Siverson, Randolph and Joel King. 1992. "Alliances and the Expansion of War," in Vasquez, John and Marie Henehan (eds.) *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*. Lanham: Lexington Books. Pgs 161-176.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, Andrew Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2000. Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5):686-699.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on

the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(3): 427-439.

*Week 15 (April 26, 2011) – Creating and Maintaining Order*

Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

*Week 16 (May 3, 2011) – International Organizations*

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4): 699-732.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): 761-799.

Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? *World Politics* 57(1): 1-38.

Hansen, Holley, Sara Mitchell, and Stephen Nemeth. 2008. IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 295-325.